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Abstract 
     Mafia-type criminal groups belonging to, or originated from, the Calabrian ‘ndrangheta 
from Southern Italy, have been object of recent academic research and media attention in 
Australia. The Australian ‘ndrangheta, as qualified form of organised crime, poses new 
challenges for law enforcement in the country. This paper briefly looks at the strategies to 
fight organised crime in Australia, with specific focus on anti-association laws. By using a 
comparative approach, the paper will look at the criminalisation of mafias as qualified 
forms of organised crime in other two jurisdictions, Italy and the USA, to advocate for an 
effective mafia criminalisation in Australia. In conclusion this paper will argue that, in or-
der to also fight mafia phenomena, criminal law in Australia should focus on behaviours of 
organised crime groups rather than only on the criminalisation of proscribed associations 
and their illegal activities.  
 
Introduction  
In recent years, both academic research (Sergi, 2012; Sergi, 2013; Sergi, 2015a; 
Spagnolo, 2010; Bennetts, 2016a) and media (McKenzie and Baker, 2009; Branley, 
2015; McKenzie et al., 2015) have looked with concern at the apparent growth of influ-
ence and power of mafia groups, of Italian origins, in certain areas of Australia. The 
groups in question are clans belonging to – or modelled upon - the ‘ndrangheta - a ma-
fia-type criminal organisation from the toe of the Italian peninsula, in the region of Ca-
labria. Thanks to an established migration from the Calabrian region to Australia since 
the early decades of the XX century, affiliates of this criminal group appear well estab-
lished in Australia (Sergi, 2015a). It has been argued that the mafia-type clans collec-
tively indicated as the ‘ndrangheta (historically known as the Honoured Society), are 
not only “rational criminal organisations”, but also involve “a set of behaviours, a 
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subculture, embedded in the local culture and kinship ties” (Sergi, 2015c: 43); the phe-
nomenon, therefore, goes beyond criminal grounds and ‘organised crime’ labels and as 
such poses new problems to law enforcement.  
This paper will firstly present a theoretical approach that sees mafia groups as both 
criminal organisations and “behavioural models” of deviance. Secondly, this paper will 
present the Calabrian ‘ndrangheta and the Australian ‘ndrangheta. The paper will then 
move towards an analysis of the criminalisation of organised crime in Australian juris-
dictions. Afterwards, it will present responses to Italian mafias in two other jurisdic-
tions: Italy – with its peculiar criminalisation of the Italian mafia phenomenon- and the 
USA - which criminalised illegal enterprises with specific references to Sicilian Cosa 
Nostra. This work advocates for a shift from an understanding of mafias (any mafia) as 
criminal organisations engaging in illegal conducts towards an understanding of mafias 
as “behavioural phenomena” criminal in nature, but also embedded in culture. Such a 
shift is beneficial also in Australia to use criminal law more effectively towards differ-
ent types of organised crime groups, including ‘ndrangheta clans.  
 
For a conceptualisation of the mafia behaviour: the Calabrian ‘ndrangheta 
With the term ‘mafia’, scholars indicate a qualified form of organised crime. In addi-
tion to committing serious, violent and other “organised” criminal activities, mafia 
groups are also typically supported by social prestige and are accepted and/or tolerated 
by their own communities (Sciarrone and Storti, 2014). Certainly, mafia groups repre-
sent the prototypical criminal structure that from the illegal world steps into the legal 
world of politics and finance (Arlacchi, 1986; Von Lampe, 2008; Paoli, 2002). On the 
other side, and this is especially true for Italian criminal groups, mafia clans are also so-
cial forces, with the ability to handle social capital (Sciarrone, 2011) and realise strate-
gic goals (Dalla Chiesa, 2010).  
The conceptualisation of mafias is constantly evolving. Also in Italy, the current de-
bate on the legal definition of mafias embraces contemporary manifestations of mafia 
power in other territories, far from Southern Italy (Dalla Chiesa, 2015; Sciarrone, 2014). 
We can identify three main aspects for a contemporary conceptualisation of mafias, par-
ticularly relevant also to the Australian scenario. Crucially, mafia groups, which exhibit 
these traits, do not necessarily have to be Italian. Arguably, any criminal group any-
where in the world can behave as a mafia group within this framework; culture, includ-
ing criminal culture, does not have to be linked to ethnic traits (Christopher et al., 2014).  
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1. Mafias are considered as unlawful associations having their own criminal 
identity. Through this identity they seek to acquire power infiltrating the legal 
world. 
2. The identity of mafias is based upon the reputation of clans and affiliates, 
which is based on the effective or potential use of intimidation and violence, 
the ability to engage with political and financial elites and the ability to effec-
tively participate in criminal markets. Reputation is built and maintained 
through the exploitation of a set of behaviours of the culture of origin.   
3. The more the clans enjoy the reputation of their ‘brand’, the more the brand 
generates intimidation. By relying on the power of their brand, clans can es-
tablish themselves as “reliable” criminal players while at the same time instil-
ling fear and omertà in the communities they live in. 
The origins and the ‘ndrangheta are lost in time in the history of Calabria, one of the 
poorest Italian regions. Today, the term ‘ndrangheta has two meanings. The first mean-
ing refers to the criminal organisation in the southern part of Calabria, in the province of 
Reggio Calabria. This criminal organisation has a unitary structure reinforced through 
both coordination mechanisms among family clans (‘ndrine) and rankings of their 
members, as indicated by Operation Crimine in 20101. The extent to which this criminal 
organisation bases its power and influence upon the control of the territory in Calabria, 
both from a political and from a financial point of view, is the essence, the core and the 
strength of the group (Sciarrone, 2011; Forgione, 2008).  
The second meaning is more nuanced and refers to a “way of being” of clans across 
all Calabria, including those that are not included within the structure of the families of 
Reggio Calabria as described by Operation Crimine. What all clans share across the re-
gion is the structure of their basic unit, based on family lines and surnames rather than 
territories (Pignatone and Prestipino, 2013). They also all support their criminal activi-
ties through an exploitation of Calabria’s shared cultural mores “through the use of 
usurpation, arrogance, intimidation, violence, and subjection, while engaging in illegal 
activities for profit” (Sergi, 2016a). In this second meaning, therefore, the word ‘ndran-
gheta indicates the mafia behaviour from Calabria (also called ‘ndranghetism). For ex-
ample, in Calabrian dialect, the verb ‘ndranghitijàri means to adopt a cocky behaviour, 
typical of a mafia affiliate.  This is very similar to the process through which the word 
“mafia” came to indicate a set of behaviours of criminal groups in Sicily (Santino, 1995; 
Hess and Osers, 1998), which also led to the interpretation of Sicilian Cosa Nostra as a 
subculture. Differently from purely cultural approaches, however, we want to stress 
how not only the two meanings of the word ‘ndrangheta go together, but certainly the 
																																								 																				
1 Operation Crimine, No. 1389/08 R.G.R.N DDA, No. 3655/11 R.G. GIP/GUP, No. 106/12 Sentenza 
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spread and evolution of any mafia phenomenon also largely depends on structural fail-
ures and weaknesses of capitalist societies (Mattina, 2011; Varese, 2011).  
 Finally, global attention to the ‘ndrangheta today (Caneppele and Sarno, 2013; 
Calderoni et al., 2015) has indeed consolidated what has been called a ‘ndranghetisa-
tion process (Sergi and Lavorgna, 2016; Sergi, 2016a). The presence of ‘ndrangheta 
clans today has been ascertained and denounced in the North of Italy, in European coun-
tries as well as in the USA, Latin America and Canada (Calderoni et al., 2015; 
Sciarrone and Storti, 2014; Sergi and Lavorgna, 2016). The ‘ndranghetisation process is 
a process of convergence of behaviours observed for criminal groups that are either Ca-
labrian or work with Calabrian associates. Outside of Calabria criminal groups with a 
Calabrian connection can benefit from the growing reputation of the ‘ndrangheta (as a 
brand, as a label) in the oligopolistic control over the cocaine trade in Europe (DNA, 
2015). This can be seen also Australia, where criminals of Calabrian origin can today 
rekindle new and old links with Calabrian ‘ndrine thanks to their blood ties with Calab-
rian migrants already in the country.  
 
The Australian ’ndrangheta 
According to the Italian National Antimafia Directorate (DNA, 2011), ‘ndrangheta 
clans  engage in two models of internationalisation: one is the colonisation model where 
the clans replicate their structure abroad. This is the case of Germany, where there is an 
established settlement of ‘ndrangheta clans (Sciarrone and Storti, 2014), but also the 
case of Canada and Australia (Sergi, 2015a). These countries have historically received 
Calabrian migrants and today have locali (consortia) of ‘ndrine that systematically ar-
range criminal activities across the borders. The other model of internationalisation is 
the delocalisation model seen in countries where the Calabrian clans operate indirectly, 
through brokers (DNA, 2012; Sergi and Lavorgna, 2016). In countries like Bolivia, Pe-
ru’ and some European states, such as Belgium or the Netherlands, ‘ndrangheta brokers 
become partners in crime of more established local criminal groups. 
     On one side it can be argued that “migration from territories of origin where 
there is a high proportion of mafiosi appears to carry the greatest threat of mafia trans-
plantation” (Varese, 2011: 16). On the other side, it can also be noted that “the phe-
nomenon of mafia colonisation” so directly dependent on migration, “is peculiar of the 
’ndrangheta only, among the Italian mafias, because, even Sicilian Cosa Nostra did not 
operate at the same level of awareness when establishing its markets outside Italy” 
(DNA, 2012: 108). As noticed by scholars (Sciarrone and Storti, 2014; Sciarrone, 2014; 
Lavorgna and Sergi, 2014), the conditions of today’s mafia movements are certainly 
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much more complex than the two models described by the Antimafia. For example, ma-
fia expansion can be conceptualised further as imitation (of clans from Calabria), infil-
tration (in the economy of arrival/destination), settlement (in the communities of arri-
val) and hybridisation (through mixture with local criminal groups), where settlement 
and hybridisation are more accentuated and advanced forms of penetration in new terri-
tories.  
The extent of the presence of the ‘ndrangheta in Australia has been only recently ob-
ject of scholarly research in English (Sergi, 2015a) but certainly has reached the wider 
public (not for the first time) in early July 2015 after an ABC Four Corners/Fairfax Me-
dia production (McKenzie et al., 2015) and since then remained in the news (Bucci et 
al., 2016; Mills, 2016). It appears that members of ‘ndrangheta clans in Australia can 
influence criminal markets, exercise violence, actual or threatened, but can also manipu-
late cultural codes of origin and their ethnic bonds to establish mutual exchanges in po-
litical and economic circles. However, the ‘ndrangheta is not a new phenomenon in 
Australia as maintained by some historical and journalistic works (Small and Gilling, 
2016).  
In Australia, the existence of mafia groups has been suspected and investigated for 
decades, while Italian authorities have often called for a more incisive partnership with 
Australia  (Macrì and Ciconte, 2009). As said, with Operation Crimine in 2010, the Dis-
trict Antimafia prosecutors in Reggio Calabria have been able to confirm the existence 
of unitary coordination structures of the ‘ndrangheta clans in the area around Reggio 
Calabria. The same operation has also confirmed the settlement of these clans in Aus-
tralia, Canada, Germany and Switzerland (Caneppele and Sarno, 2013; Sergi, 2016a). 
Nevertheless, the phenomenon has been largely underestimated in Australia, most likely 
because too difficult to fit within the accepted rhetoric of organised crime strategies and 
criminal policies in the country (Bennetts, 2016b). This does not surprise when looking 
at the difficulties many countries encounter today when dealing with mafia mobility 
(Campana, 2013; Morselli et al., 2011). As noticed (Morselli et al., 2011: 185) “the 
principal mistake that any policymaker or law-enforcement agent could do is to ignore 
a serious problem for an extended period”. Arguably, next to legal challenges, the igno-
rance of serious problems for an extended period of time is often linked to the percep-
tion of the mafia phenomenon abroad (Allum, 2013; Sarno, 2014; Neubacher, 2013). In 
other words, on one side there is still a perpetuation of the ‘mafia myth’: Italian mafias 
are still perceived as foreign, ethnic-centred phenomena, in between stereotyped images 
of the Godfather and of Italian migrants. At the same time, however, there is a tendency 
to dismiss the mafia myth as a popular and mediatic representation of organised crime, 
not applicable to the majority of countries today. In Australia, despite the media and 
popular attention to mafias, including the ‘ndrangheta, “data suggests that organised 
crime groups have developed a criminal network structure (i.e., highly flexible and mo-
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bile groups of known associates) and that shared ethnicity has become less of a barrier 
in creating criminal alliances” (Leiva and Bright, 2015: 2). Leiva and Bright (2015) 
have demonstrated through a media analysis how the mafia myth in Australia still in-
trigues, in a journalistic sense, but remains anchored in popular perceptions and not into 
policy-making.  
From a policing perspective, the Australian authorities have detected the presence of 
the Calabrian mafia in the country in many occasions. First and foremost, in drugs oper-
ations, like the one that led to the seizure of 4.4 tonnes of MDMA in Melbourne in 
2008. This was not an isolated business. Italian authorities had already been able to in-
vestigate drug trafficking networks operating across the globe, between Calabria and 
Australia, transiting African countries and/or North America (mainly Canada) and using 
the ports in Adelaide and in Melbourne (Sergi, 2012). Furthermore, the involvement of 
mafia families in cannabis plantations in New South Wales in the 1970s-1980s (Small 
and Gilling, 2016; Forgione, 2008; Macrì and Ciconte, 2009) has been public 
knowledge for a while. What is probably less known is that Australian federal authori-
ties have been carrying out thorough assessments and evaluations of mafia families with 
Calabrian connections since the 1960s. In a file in the National Archives in Canberra we 
find a report from J. Cusack, seconded from the FBI to investigate a series of murders in 
Melbourne in 1964. This report is particularly interesting as it shows a very deep under-
standing of the phenomenon of the ‘ndrangheta when even Italy did not understand it 
properly (Paoli, 1994). Indeed, Australians have known about the ‘ndrangheta decades 
before Italy properly tackled the phenomenon at regional and national levels. According 
to Cusack2: 
“The Calabrian L’Onorata Società is well entrenched in Australia […] Within      the next twenty-five 
years if unchecked, the Society is capable of diversification into all facets of organised crime and legiti-
mate business. This could very well include narcotics […]. Their large cash resources and strong-arm tac-
tics will eventually enable them to develop monopolies and large profit in […] labour racketeering […] 
distribution of Italian food, […] monopolistic ownership of night clubs, building and road construction 
companies”. 
In Australia - and only in Australia as far as we know - the mafia conceptualisation, 
in popular perspectives as well as in institutional ones, has always been linked to the 
‘ndrangheta and the Calabrian community exclusively. Certainly, there have been a 
number of resonant cases, especially murders, that have involved Calabrian criminals in 
Australia and have more than once questioned the influence of criminal groups of Ca-
labrian origin in the country. Some of these cases have never actually proved the in-
volvement of any ‘ndrangheta member, but the police have raised doubts in connections 
																																								 																				
2 Italian Criminal Society – complicity in the distribution of forged currency, National Archives, 
A432, Barcode 3190972, page 23 
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to Calabrian clans in all of these cases. These include, for example, the murder of Don-
ald MacKay, member of the Liberal Party, killed in 1977 in Griffith, because of its 
harsh campaign against drug productions (Spagnolo, 2010). Also, there was the murder 
of Colin Winchester, Deputy Chief of the Australian Federal Police, killed in 1989 in 
Canberra (Campbell et al., 1992), whose case has been subjected to an enquiry in 2012 
reinforcing the idea of mafia involvement (Knaus, 2015), which was however never 
proved. In 1994 the murder of Geoffrey Bowen, National Crime Authority detective, 
killed in Adelaide, was object of growing public interest also because of a mafia con-
nection (Madigan, 2013). Recently, in March 2016, a lawyer of Calabrian origin and 
with alleged mafia families in his client list, was shot in Melbourne; journalists have 
raised doubts about his cooperation with authorities against the ‘ndrangheta (Bucci et 
al., 2016; Bachelard, 2016) in a very controversial case of the recent years (Bachelard et 
al., 2015; McKenzie and Baker, 2009). An inquiry in 2009, which followed yet another 
journalistic effort (Murphy et al., 2008; McKenzie and Baker, 2009) has found that a 
number of donations to the Liberal Party had been made by Calabrian crime families in 
Melbourne (Bennetts and Sergi, 2015). These donations were supported by members of 
the Calabrian community in order to prevent the expulsion of a Calabrian-born individ-
ual after his visa application had been rejected in various occasions and before he was 
sentenced for drug trafficking in 2014 (McKenzie et al., 2015; Sergi, 2015a).  
Today, the ‘ndrangheta in Australia is not just Calabrian but also Australian. aAc-
cording to the Italian authorities, individuals of the ‘ndrangheta from the area of Reggio 
Calabria are in all the major Australian cities; they appear well connected among them-
selves, wealthy and most of all hidden and protected by ethnic solidarity (Calderoni et 
al., 2015; Sergi and Lavorgna, 2016; DNA, 2011). Furthermore, there have been claims 
of ‘ndrangheta affiliates working with local criminal groups, such as Outlaw Motorcy-
cle Gangs (OMGs), for the street distribution of drugs (Bachelard et al., 2015).  
Crucially, the various manifestations of the Calabrian clans in Australia might have 
been favoured by the large migration fluxes from Calabria to Australia. The peculiar 
preservation of Calabrian values, cultural codes, rituals and traditions in certain parts of 
Australia - notwithstanding generational evolution (Marino and Chiro, 2014) - has dis-
simulated the growth of mafia families within the Calabrian community. The exploita-
tion of shared cultural codes is typical of mafia behaviour. This also makes the relation-
ship between Calabrian criminals and the Calabrian communities very problematic 
(Bennetts, 2016a) and difficult to understand outside the Calabrian community. While it 
is necessary to understand that blood and family ties are the cement of the clans as they 
guarantee trust, longevity, resilience and endurance of the group, ethnic stereotypes 
must be avoided. 
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The Australian ‘ndrangheta is an unusual type of organised crime phenomenon com-
pared to what Australia is used to, as we will see in the next sections. As the Calabrian 
clans do not present themselves as “outlaw” – often not even in their manifestations, 
usually under the radar – anti-association laws and control orders – the most common 
response to organised crime in Australia  - are difficult to apply. As they are not only 
drug traffickers, but in Australia they seem able to carry out a range of different activi-
ties including political infiltration and certainly money laundering, they are not solely a 
target for drugs laws. Indeed, the problem is that we do not know who ‘they’ are and 
how (much) they are organised in Australia. We cannot yet say for sure whether there 
are clans and individuals from the ‘ndrangheta in Calabria rekindling contacts with 
those family members that once moved to Australia or whether there are local criminal 
groups in Australia modelled on the Calabrian ‘ndrangheta clans. More research is in-
deed needed. It is likely that, in terms of mafia expansion (Sciarrone and Storti, 2014), 
the Australian-Calabrian clans might be today at the hybridisation stage after a period of 
settlement. In the 1980s the Australian Bureau of Criminal Intelligence had mapped the 
known family clans through family trees3. These family clans were fully part of the Ital-
ian and Calabrian migrant communities, but are now, 30 years later, certainly Australian 
as well. As they shared the cultural codes of migrant communities, they have grown 
protected and hidden within families, exploiting the values of endogenous marriages 
and friendships based on similar social and cultural values – exploiting the normal life 
of Calabrian migrants in different parts of Australia. In addition, these criminal struc-
tures and their members have today the possibility to benefit from the increased reputa-
tion and expansion of the ‘ndrangheta clans worldwide, through the on-going process of 
‘ndranghetisation. To criminalise their behaviours is therefore, the challenge of today’s 
law enforcement in the country within and beyond the remit of the criminalisation of 
organised crime.  
 
The criminalisation of organised crime in Australia 
     As reminded by Ayling (2014) the political arrangements of Australia - a federation 
consisting of nine jurisdictions, of which six states, two territories and the Common-
wealth - do not facilitate institutional arrangements in the fight against organised crime, 
especially in terms of criminal law and procedure. In fact, the impossibility for the fed-
eral parliament to enact criminal laws promotes considerable diversity across Australian 
states; in this sense we can talk about different Australian systems of criminal law, albe-
it within a shared Model Criminal Code. The Commonwealth, however, can enact laws 
for customs, external affairs, and protection of the financial interests of Australia and its 
																																								 																				
33 The Author has the files related to these family trees. 
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citizens. These powers - together with those of the Australian Federal Police (AFP) and 
the Australian Crime Commission (ACC), and the ultimate function of the High Court 
in the harmonisation of criminal law across states - have often resulted in the Com-
monwealth having a say in matters generally related to the policing of organised crimes 
as cross-border crimes (Bronitt, 2011).  
     On a preliminary note, organised crime in Australia, like in many other countries 
(Carrapico, 2014) is classified as a threat to national security (Australian Government, 
2015), but is criminalised at the national level. Moreover, as noticed, organised crime is, 
in Australia, a very public matter: “for Australian public, incidents of public violence 
are the most forceful reminder that organised crime exists” (Ayling, 2014: 84). In order 
to fight the visible dimension of organised crime, policies against organised crime have 
been developing around key targets emerging from criminal trends; crucially, from the 
assessment of trends in criminal markets intelligence agencies can identify different 
threats, organised in clusters (such as “different illicit markets” or “key emerging 
threats”) (ACC, 2015).  
     This tendency is noticeable in the well-known deployment of legal weapons against 
Outlaw Motorcycle Gangs (OMGs), which have been the main focus/trend of criminal 
policy across jurisdictions in Australia, even when officially the emphasis was on gen-
eral anti-organised crime issues (Gray, 2009; Ayling, 2011b; Ayling, 2014; Ayling, 
2011a). The criminalisation of organised crime in Australia in the past years has been 
fundamentally enacted at the national level as it could not be otherwise, but state law in 
this field has been highly influenced by the Commonwealth call for securitisation 
(Morgan et al., 2010).  
     State legislations for the control of organised crime in Australia are anti-association 
laws punishing the membership to proscribed unlawful organisations. Anti-association 
laws represent the core of the legislative approach against organised crime. Versions of 
these laws exist today in all Australian jurisdictions, with the exceptions of Tasmania 
and the Australian Capital Territory. More specifically, these are: the Criminal Organi-
sations Act 2009 (and the Criminal Law (Criminal Organisation Disruption) Amend-
ment Act 2013) in Queensland; the Serious and Organised Crime (Control) Act 2008, 
for South Australia; the Crimes (Criminal Organisations Control) Act 2009 in New 
South Wales; the Criminal Organisations Control Act 2012 in Western Australia; the 
Criminal Organisations Control Act 2012 in Victoria; Serious Crime Control Act 2009 
in the Northern Territory. Even though authors generally agree that the focus of these 
anti-associations laws are OMGs (Lauchs et al., 2015; Ayling, 2011a; Martin, 2014), 
“the legislation itself almost never refers specifically to such organisations and usually 
applies generally to any person or group that can be shown to meet the definitions” 
(NSW Parliamentary Research Service, 2013: 2).  
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What all anti-association laws have in common is that they are based on individ-
ual prosecutions for participation in criminal organisations, which have been previously 
declared unlawful because they engage in serious criminal activities. These unlawful as-
sociations and their members are afterwards placed under scrutiny via control orders. 
These laws have been harshly criticised on the basis that they “penalise identity rather 
than behaviour” (Ayling, 2014: 98). Other criticisms have been expressed at the judi-
cial level. For example, the Rule of Law Institute of Australia (2014: 6) sustains that 
“law reform and government should focus on ways to support the police prosecuting 
members of criminal organisations for criminal offences, not an offence which relies on 
criminalising association”. Similarly, the High Court declared these provisions invalid 
in various occasions because they exceeded the powers of the courts in making a decla-
ration about a criminal organisation without requiring appropriate reasons4. However, in 
2013, in ‘Pampano’5, the High Court considered valid the provisions in the Criminal 
Organisation Act 2009 (Queensland) and endorsed the use of ‘secret criminal intelli-
gence’ to declare an organisation unlawful. Notwithstanding the criticisms to this 
judgement (Martin, 2014), in Pampano the High Court confirms what already clear to 
scholars (McGarrity, 2012; Lynch et al., 2010): control orders against criminal organi-
sations (with OMGs in mind) are of the same nature of anti-terrorism laws, they require 
the same steps (declaration of the organisation followed by a control order) and they can 
use the same type of (secret) intelligence. This essentially confirms the Commonwealth 
security connotation of organised crime via endorsement of state criminal law.  
Together with anti-association laws and control orders, many Australian jurisdictions 
rely on other fortification orders, removal orders, restriction orders and consorting of-
fences6 also within the common law doctrine of ‘common purpose’ and ‘complicity’. As 
we will see later in this paper the scope of these norms is frustrated when combined to 
the anti-association laws, especially but not only, for targeting mafia behaviours.  
If it is true that the Australian criminalisation of organised crime follows visible 
trends, which then are targeted by criminal law, then - should the crisis linked to the 
Australian ‘ndrangheta clans visibly grow - mafia criminalisation might be an expected 
outcome. However, within the more general approach against organised crime as seen 
across Australian jurisdictions, the only way to actually criminalise mafias would be by 
																																								 																				
4 See for example, Wainohu v New South Wales (2011) 243 CLR 181, 208 [44] (French CJ and Kiefel 
J) and South Australia v Totani (2010) 242 CLR 1. 
5 Assistant Commissioner Condon v Pompano Pty Ltd (2013) 295 ALR 638, 676 [133] (Hayne, Cren-
nan, Kiefel and Bell JJ) (‘Pompano’). 
6 See for example the Vagrancy (Repeal) and Summary Offences (Amendment) Act 2005 with inser-
tion of section 49F in the Summary Offences Act 1966 in Western Australia. This section provides: (1) A 
person must not, without reasonable excuse, habitually consort with a person who has been found guilty 
of, or who is reasonably suspected of having committed, an organised crime offence (as further defined). 
	 11	
adding the ‘ndrangheta to the list of proscribed criminal associations. This, however, is 
bound to be a very unpopular choice: first, because it would carry the risk of criminalis-
ing ethnic connotations (the Calabrian element of the ‘ndrangheta) and second, as said, 
because we do not actually know how formal is the organisational structure of the Ca-
labrian clans in Australia. The risk would be, once again, to target (ethnic) identities and 
not (mafia) behaviours, which the ‘ndrangheta exhibits also in Australia. By looking at 
comparative examples from Italy and the USA for their responses against mafia-type 
groups we can initiate a discussion on the criminalisation of behaviours of organised 
crime in Australia. 
 
Criminal Enterprises, Unlawful Associations and the Criminalisation of Mafia Be-
haviours in Italy and in the USA 
The literature on the criminalisation of organised crime and mafias in USA and in It-
aly  also looks at the difficulties of transferring these policies to other countries 
(Schloenhardt, 2010; Calderoni, 2010; Ayling, 2011a; Obokata, 2010). Certainly, expe-
riences in Italy and in the USA (at the federal level) are relevant to the Australian dis-
course for various reasons. Notwithstanding the differences in legal systems, both Italy 
and the USA have found ad hoc solutions to incorporate the fight against mafia-type 
groups within a more general criminalisation of organised crime in line with their own 
legal traditions.  
In the USA the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO) in 1970 
was designed to fight what was enemy no.1, Sicilian mafia families. However, (La) Co-
sa Nostra (known as LCN) was never mentioned formally in the law (Lynch, 1987; 
Jacobs et al., 1994). As summarised (Blakey and Goldstock, 1980: 348): 
RICO states that if a person commits two of these offences he is guilty of ‘‘racketeering activi-
ty’’ and is therefore subject to additional penalties. The umbrella effect of the RICO statute adds 
the concept of ‘‘enterprise’’ to a criminal prosecution, requiring additional proof of a ‘‘pattern’’ 
of racketeering activity and its relationship to an ‘‘enterprise’’ in addition to that required to 
prove the individual crimes alleged.  
In RICO, the criminal enterprise - especially when it is of mafia-type, as clear from 
the supporting papers to the Act (Lynch, 1987; Blakey, 1990) and in the Manual to Fed-
eral Prosecutors (DOJ, 2009) - multiplies the danger of a conspiracy because of the con-
tinuity of crimes committed in a pattern. The simple sum of different criminal activities 
is not as dangerous as a criminal plan formulated by a resilient criminal group over a 
certain period of time. The threat targeted by RICO is the continuity of the pattern of 
criminal activities, the resilience of the criminal plan committed by individuals in rela-
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tionship with each other. The reference to mafia groups in this conceptualisation of or-
ganised crime(s) is clear. However, RICO would “apply not only to La Cosa Nostra, 
but to any group of individuals banded together into an "association in fact" to commit 
any of the wide range of crimes defined as "typical of organized crime” (Lynch, 1987: 
684). Mafia groups represent ‘associations in fact’ and, as such, they can be prosecuted 
and have indeed been prosecuted as (criminal) enterprises in some of the most success-
ful applications of RICO. 
Similarly to RICO, but with a more blatant national character, the Italian Anti-mafia 
law derives from violent attacks to the state connected to Cosa Nostra in Sicily (Nanula, 
1999). A simple unlawful association offence already criminalised organised crime in 
Italy (article 416 Penal Code). The mafia-type unlawful association offence, which was 
introduced in 1982 (article 416-bis Penal Code) is meant to protect the public from 
criminal groups - mafia groups - that not only reject the exclusivity of state sovereignty, 
but also alter democratic processes and economic competition (Ardizzone, 2002). It has 
been argued (Fiore, 1988; Maiello and Fiandaca, 2014) that the mafia-type unlawful as-
sociation law in Italy has been more a socio-anthropological response to an emergency 
situation than a rational legal step. While we agree that the criminalisation of the mafia 
phenomenon in Italy is certainly linked to Sicilian Cosa Nostra, like in RICO, the Italian 
offence has stretched throughout the years to include other mafia-types groups, includ-
ing the ‘ndrangheta (Dalla Chiesa, 2010). Mafias, for the purposes of Penal Code (arti-
cle 416-bis), manifest through the following: the existence of associative bonds that in-
timidate the community; the condition of subjection of both associates and non associ-
ates to the group and their ‘omertà’ (voluntary silence, non-cooperation with authori-
ties); the commission of criminal activities by the group as a whole to directly or indi-
rectly acquire control of business activities, authorisations, licences, contracts, public 
services or other gain or benefit; the ability to influence and/or alter political elections.  
Both Italian and US legislations accept the criminalisation of an enter-
prise/association engaged in criminal activities, which has an impact on politics and so-
cial relationships. Both countries have first attempted to deal with mafias as criminal 
entities, by making it an offence to be a member of unlawful associations/criminal en-
terprises and anticipate criminal liability to the membership stage (Sergi, 2014). After-
wards, both countries have targeted the legitimate faces of mafia groups, the US by clar-
ifying how “enterprises” can be both “associations in fact” and “associations in law”7 
entirely criminal in nature (Neuenschwander, 1981), Italy mostly by targeting the poli-
																																								 																				
7 In particular in United States v Turkette (101 S. Ct. 2524 (1981)) the Supreme Court resolved the 
conflict over the scope of the term "enterprise" by including also “associations in fact”, as wholly illegi-
timate enterprises, 10 years after the introduction of RICO.  
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tics-mafia nexus and the infiltration in public services, which are part of the definition 
of mafias in the Penal Code.  
There are differences between the Italian offence of mafia-type unlawful association 
and the US offence of criminal enterprise due to the countries’ legal traditions. Both 
systems certainly criminalise the entity – association or enterprise – and aggregate vari-
ous individual penal responsibilities under the same indictment. The Italian offence 
criminalises the affiliation to a mafia-type organisation and in doing so, it essentially 
qualifies the unlawfulness of the association. Being “mafia-type” is a criminal offence 
in itself; this is a primary crime, it does not need any crime to be committed first 
(Mantovani, 2007). In the USA, the criminalisation of the enterprise as “association in 
fact” engaged in a pattern of racketeering activities, makes the RICO offences deriva-
tive crimes (Anderson and Jackson, 2004): the racketeering activities reveal the criminal 
plan of an enterprise and make it unlawful. The difference between the two formulas is 
subtle but substantial. The Italian offence of mafia-type unlawful association criminalis-
es a mafia behavioural model of being criminal – by defining its traits in the law – its 
way of being. Notably, instead of simply criminalising the participation to one mafia (as 
a proscribed criminal organisation), the law leaves the definition open to any mafia, to 
allow a net-widening effect. In the USA, RICO offences do not define the behaviours of 
criminal enterprise a priori, but rather its behaviours when in action: it is the pattern of 
racketeering activities (as defined in section 1961(1) of RICO) over a set period of time 
that defines the enterprise, any enterprise, as criminal.  
Both laws in Italy and in the USA target behaviours and do not just criminalise asso-
ciations or organisations. This is clear also when looking at investigations and prosecu-
tions of individuals (such as politicians for example), who support mafia’s political 
choices - the so called ‘grey area’, the facilitators (Maiello and Fiandaca, 2014; 
Fiandaca, 2010). In Italy, there is an offence – “concorso esterno in associazione mafi-
osa” (external participation in mafia association) – which is still centred around the un-
lawful association and not the single individual participation. As specified by the Italian 
Supreme Court8: 
“To qualify the ‘concorso esterno’ as the contribution of a single participant and not by referring to 
the overall criminal organisation, risks to reduce this offence to mere conspiracy (…) It is instead the ma-
terial conduct within the unlawful association of the subject, as manifested by a reciprocal, enduring and 
lasting commitment, functionally oriented to support the activities and the structure of the criminal asso-
ciation”.  
																																								 																				
8 Corte di Cassazione, Sezione Penale, Sezioni Unite, Sentence 22327/2002, known as “Sentenza Car-
nevale”, translated from Italian.  
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The external participation in mafia association is an offence that is peculiar to Italy 
and its history of corruption at the highest levels of government (Paoli, 2007). However, 
political corruption, as an endemic characteristic of mafia groups, and especially at the 
local level, is not alien to mafia clans in the US as well (Finckenauer, 2001). RICO as 
well has also been used to tackle the mafia (organised crime) - politics nexus, often by 
using corruption as a predicate offence (racketeering activity). Also, specifically section 
1962(c) of RICO makes it unlawful for any person, including a public official to con-
duct or participate in the conduct of a criminal enterprise, in law or in fact.   
In conclusion, by avoiding the criminalisation of named and proscribed formal 
groups (as mafia does not only mean Sicilian Cosa Nostra or the Calabrian ‘ndrangheta 
neither in the Italian Penal Code nor in RICO’s interpretation), both legislations, with 
due differences, target a criminal behavioural model that can be exhibited by various 
criminal groups. In Italy this model is called ‘mafia’, in an attempt to stigmatise the 
prevalence and the symbolic meaning of the phenomenon in he country (Sergi, 2015b). 
In the USA, the mafia label was intended but has been dropped (Blakey, 1990), de facto 
allowing the use of RICO much beyond its initial interpretation. In particular, dropping 
the mafia label has also allowed the USA not to incur in the criminalisation of the ethnic 
dimension associated, especially at the time RICO was passed, with (Italian) mafias 
(Goodwin, 2002; Jacobs, 2006). 
 
Towards a criminalisation of mafia and organised crime behaviours in Australia 
By looking at both the Italian and the US experiences, we can draw preliminary con-
siderations on the Australian context towards a revision of the criminalisation of organ-
ised crime groups. This revision could lead to more homogenous strategies at the feder-
al level, and would also include a more efficient to deal with mafia-type behaviours of 
Calabrian-Australian ‘ndrangheta clans.  
In Australia there seems to be a mismatch between the intelligence focus of Com-
monwealth agencies to target organised crime groups’ activities and the impossibility to 
enact a federal offence against them. Drug trafficking offences as well as counter-
terrorism offences have been federalised through the principles in section 51 of the 
Commonwealth Constitution (Powers of the Parliament) related to customs, influx of 
criminals, external affairs (Bronitt, 2011). The national security classification of organ-
ised crime and the mandate of the Australian Crime Commission, the Australian Federal 
Police and the Attorney’s General Department could drive legislation within the same 
frameworks of counter-terrorism. As noticed (Connery, 2013: 13):  
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“The Commonwealth also has critical responsibilities for crime prevention and prosecution. They in-
clude responsibility for banking, telecommunications and border security, (…) general constitutional re-
sponsibilities under the Commonwealth’s executive and foreign affairs powers. There’s a significant      
external dimension to organised crime too: foreign states can be sources of illegal goods and bases for 
crime perpetrated in Australia. Links between domestic and overseas criminal groups add to that dimen-
sion”. 
When it comes to the Australian ‘ndrangheta clans, but without limiting the reason-
ing to mafia-type groups, the links with overseas criminal networks are part of the alarm 
raised by Italian and European authorities (Sergi, 2015a). Furthermore, their criminal 
activities can amount to an interference with the political and financial well-being of 
Australia.  
At the Commonwealth level a criminalisation of organised crime as criminal enter-
prise - to include mafia-type groups - should not endorse current approaches at state 
level, such as the contested criminalisation of proscribed associations. The criminalisa-
tion of a set of behaviours of criminal groups (in lieu of the criminalisation of pro-
scribed associations) can be agreed upon Australian conceptualisations of criminal phe-
nomena as well as federal requirements. In other words, once established that the crimi-
nalisation of organised crime can indeed fit within the Constitutional principles of the 
Commonwealth, a federal offence against organised crime can define which behaviours 
best describe unlawful associations and/or criminal enterprises in the country. This can 
include the behaviours of the Australian ‘ndrangheta clans as well as those of other 
groups, such as OMGs, 
As previously seen, the main difference between the US strategy against criminal en-
terprises and the Italian strategy against mafia-type unlawful association is in the quali-
fication of the enemy tackled. A criminal enterprise remains an anonymous enemy 
(notwithstanding what we know about the birth of RICO), while mafia-type unlawful 
associations are qualified and non-anonymous enemies in the Italian symbolic stand 
against its own national mafia groups (Sergi, 2015b). The US choice relates to political 
fairness: a “mafia” label could lead or endorse a cultural bias towards Italian (Sicilian) 
migrants.  
In the Australian experience we have seen how the intended “enemy” of the organ-
ised crime strategy has more or less implicitly been identified with motorcycle gangs as 
non-exclusive targets. Without advocating for the introduction of a mafia label - as the 
mafia phenomenon remains in Australia one of many other criminal issues - it appears 
more appropriate to follow RICO’s example and maintain the enemy anonymous. As in 
RICO, however, an organised crime offence should be looking at what organised crime 
groups do and how they do it in the country of reference rather than how they are. In 
other words, Australia seems more suited for a dynamic approach to tackle organised 
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crime groups’ behaviours, on the model of RICO, rather than adopting an explicit label 
against mafia. This is, again, in consideration of the possible bias attached to mafias in 
Australia with its specific reference to Italian (Calabrian) migrants and their descend-
ants. Conversely, the criminalisation of the behaviours typical of the ‘ndrangheta (i.e. 
the exploitation of shared cultural and family values from Calabria) within a more gen-
eral criminalisation of a set of behaviours of organised crime groups or criminal enter-
prises would certainly be beneficial for investigations and evidence gathering. 
Furthermore, a dynamic approach that criminalises behaviours of organised crime 
groups, could also target the supporters of these groups, those facilitators who are in be-
tween the under-world and the upper-world, the in-betweeners (Sergi, 2016b). Australi-
an consorting laws come to mind. For instance, under section 35(1) of South Australia’s 
Serious and Organised Crime (Control) Act 2008, it is an offence to consort 6 or more 
times in 12 months with a person who is a member of a declared organisation or subject 
to a control order. Consorting laws – where consorting can happen by any means – are 
still dependent on anti-association offences and have been opposed by both jurispru-
dence and academia (NSW Parliamentary Research Service, 2013; Ayling and 
Broadhurst, 2014). Moreover, as the use of anti-association laws is not homogeneous 
across Australian jurisdictions, so is the use of consorting laws. While they constitute an 
extreme example of ‘guilt by association’ offences, problematic to justify under the rule 
of law (Rule of Law Institute of Australia, 2014), the success of these laws in catching 
supporters of mafia-type or other criminal groups is bound to be low. Indeed, as organi-
sations have to be declared unlawful before any consorting law can be used, the focus 
shifts on the proximity of an individual to a criminal group, rather than on his/her sub-
stantial contribution to the activities of that group. As reminded in the Italian experi-
ence, the goal is not to target the occasional conspiracy or proximity, which common 
law principles already do, but to capture in criminal law the substantial, enduring and 
lasting bonds among individuals because they increase the risks posed by criminal asso-
ciations and reinforce the groups’ (criminal) reputation (Fiandaca, 2010). While the re-
quirements of consorting 6 or more times in 12 months is a start towards establishing an 
offence based on the continuity of criminal bonds, the focus of these offences still re-
mains on the individual. This does not allow a more sophisticated and long-term under-
standing of the way criminal networks - including, but not limited to, mafia-type ones - 
work in the country over stretched periods of time.  
 
Conclusion 
     This article has argued that the main challenge to effectively criminalise organised 
crime groups in Australia, to also include the Australian ‘ndrangheta clans, is to recog-
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nise, as done in the USA and in Italy, that a legal response can be based on targeting 
mafia behaviours rather than mafia organisations, singled out through labels and names.      
     As mafia groups are both cultural and structural phenomena also linked to failures of 
capitalist society (Mattina, 2011), countering strategies against mafia groups have to 
consider both the cultural elements of these phenomena and the structural weaknesses 
of the territories they exploit. In the case of the Australian ‘ndrangheta, this peculiar 
combination of cultural and structural elements has to be approached without generating 
a moral panic or making a new (or actually old – see Harvey (1948)) folk devil of the 
Italian, and specifically, Calabrian migrants in the country. Indeed, understanding the 
cultural elements of the ‘ndrangheta does not mean labelling Calabrian culture, but ra-
ther studying mafia mobility and groups’ social behaviours with a critical cultural 
awareness (Christopher et al., 2014). The behaviours of ‘ndrangheta’s affiliates – their 
rituals, the use of the Calabrian dialect, the importance of family-based ties and endoge-
nous marriages - are rooted in Calabrian customs, values and traditions. However, at the 
same time, these behaviours could not mature or grow without the ability to exploit in-
stitutions, opportunities and structural weaknesses of the Australian territories the clans 
live in. The Australian ‘ndrangheta is indeed a hybrid model of mafia mobility 
(Sciarrone and Storti, 2014) based on opportunity-seeking on one side and a powerful 
(criminal) brand on the other. In Australia, the reputation of the Calabrian ‘ndrangheta – 
its criminal behavioural model known around world through the on-going ‘ndrangheti-
sation process – ensures support and subjection to the clans. The Australian ‘ndran-
gheta’s criminal behavioural model is made of their established (criminal) reputation - 
which is based on their “way of doing business” - together with their hiding behind Ca-
labrian cultural codes. Through criminal reputation and cultural disguise, the clans can 
commit small or large scale criminal offences and manage or control political and eco-
nomic activities. It seems clear that their modus agendi does not fit within current crim-
inalisation of criminal groups in the country and needs to target both criminal behav-
iours and social ones.   
     The criminalisation of organised crime in Australia is left to national states and tar-
gets individual participation to proscribed associations. Throughout this paper we have 
reminded the benefits of a criminal law offence that, instead of targeting the identity of 
associations, targets their behaviours as enterprises. When looking at comparative expe-
riences we have found that both the Italian unlawful association offences and the con-
cept of criminal enterprises in the USA are good practices. As specified, both countries 
chose to criminalise behaviours of organised crime groups, either a priori (Italian mafia 
offences) or a posteriori (US RICO offences). Also, both countries built a strategy 
against mafia groups: Italy officially used the word “mafia” while the USA chose a 
more (politically) neutral terminology (criminal enterprise).  
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Despite the wealth of information on effective organised crime and mafia legisla-
tions, Australian jurisdictions have so far refrained from introducing these policies. Ar-
guably, the impediments are in the way federal law works. In addition, the problematic, 
fragmented, and often obsolete conceptualisation of mafias in the country has delayed 
appropriate responses in the law. Effective laws should aim at reducing the possibilities 
of mobility of criminal groups and the exploitation of the reputation of a brand name. 
As noticed in the literature “increased law-enforcement results in more decentralised 
criminal markets and, thus, greater competition between criminal groups” (Morselli et 
al., 2011: 185)-.  
Certainly the criminalisation of unlawful associations and criminal enterprises in 
Australia would also imply a better understanding of mafia-type organised crime in the 
country. The criminalisation of mafia behaviours can and has to be distinguished from 
the everyday popular meaning of “the mafia” – the traditional image of a patronage-
based group operating mostly in the south of Italy or in the USA. It is the everyday 
meaning that creates ethnic bias and not a legal conceptualisation of criminal behaviours 
of mafia groups. The criminalisation of organised crime and mafia groups can be more 
effective by moving away from the focus on individual crimes and proscribed organisa-
tions towards a criminalisation of behaviours of enterprises or unlawful associations. 
These behaviours, obviously adopted by individuals, are the manifestations of mafia 
clans’ influence and reputation and result in conditions of intimidation, submission and 
silence among affiliates and non-affiliates.  
It is a long way to go. However, as argued throughout this paper, the main step is a 
cultural shift before any legal reform can actually be meaningful in Australia. Indeed, 
simply providing joinders of defendants, multi-conspiracy charges or new offences of 
criminal enterprise might be pointless unless the whole system recognises the reasoning 
behind such initiatives and fully embraces the conceptualisations of criminal behaviour-
al models of organised crime and mafia groups under criminal law.  
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